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Quick Review of ST Contents |
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Development |
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Functional Requirements Rationalization |
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Assurance Requirements Rationalization |
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PP Compliance Claims |
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TOE Summary Specification |
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Developer Response to Statement of Requirements |
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Contains Requirements Similar to PP |
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Specific Set - Based on Implementation |
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Statement of “I Provide” |
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Introduction |
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TOE
Description |
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Security
Environment |
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Assumptions |
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Threats |
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Organizational Security
Policies |
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Security
Objectives |
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Security
Requirements |
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Functional Req’ts |
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Assurance Req’ts |
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TOE
Summary Specification |
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PP
Claims |
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Rationale |
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Need to Consider Whether: |
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Objectives address environment |
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Requirements address Objectives |
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Consistency |
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Completeness |
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Technical Soundness |
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Rationale |
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Sample Objectives |
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Sample Suitability |
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Sample Dependency |
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Sample Completeness |
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Approach taken |
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Map security objectives onto threats |
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in tabular form (AGFW PP) |
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Justify suitability of objectives for each
threat, e.g. |
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T2 An
attacker on the hostile network may exploit inappropriate use of service
protocols |
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O2 and O3 limit the hosts and service ports that
can be accessed from, respectively, the hostile and private networks. O6 monitors possible attacks, providing
the firewall administrator with the means of detecting them and hence
taking appropriate action. |
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Approach taken |
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Map functional requirements onto security
objectives |
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in tabular form RBAC, Controlled Access and AGFW
PP |
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Justify suitability of each objective, e.g. |
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O1 The
firewall must limit the valid range of addresses expected on each of the
private and hostile networks |
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FTA_TSE.1 provides the capability of limiting
access in the manner required by O1, and FPT_RVM.1 ensures that this
function is always invoked when required. |
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Approach taken |
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Assign each Security Functional Requirement a
reference number |
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Draw up a table covering all functional
components, e.g. |
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Build on dependency analysis |
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Show defence against bypassing & tampering |
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tabular form |
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supported by explanation of general principles,
e.g. |
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Tampering attacks are prevented by ..... |
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FPT_SEP.3 which maintains domain separation,
preventing external tampering with the security functions |
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Security functions which restrict the
modification of attributes to authorised administrator e.g. FTA_MTD.1.1 |
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Need to Consider Whether: |
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Objectives address environment |
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Requirements address Objectives |
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Consistency |
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Completeness |
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Technical Soundness |
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Assert EAL4 is known set of components: |
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mutually supportive and internally consistent |
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for which dependencies are satisfied |
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Assurance always supports functionality |
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Justify assurance level chosen |
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EAL4 requires no specialist techniques |
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defence against sophisticated attacks: must have
access to low-level design / source code |
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ADO_DEL.2 - Detection of Modification |
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Added threat that the TOE may be modified before
delivery |
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The security objective is to protect the
integrity of the TOE |
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The non-IT environment provides procedures and
measures to detect modification, as defined in the environmental policy |
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Claim of compliance with a PP |
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ST Summary Specification |
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List of PPs that an ST Claims to Meet |
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None |
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Simple Reference to PP(s) |
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Qualified Reference to PP(s) |
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Extension to PP(s) |
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Show all PP requirements covered |
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ST requirements included where different |
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Mapping of functions onto requirements shown in
tabular form |
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Show all PP operations completed |
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demonstrated by means of table |
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Justify PP additions |
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3 additional functional requirements |
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justified why supportive of other requirements |
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additional dependencies shown to be satisfied |
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Security Functions to meet requirements &
how |
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Security Mechanisms/Techniques to meet
requirements & how |
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Security Assurance Measures to meet requirements
& how |
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Example 1 (AC_1) |
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The TOE will control access on the basis of |
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apparent source IP address or host name |
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apparent source port number |
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destination IP address or host name |
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destination port number |
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Example 2 (AC_3) |
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The following proxies are supported, which
support access based on source and target: |
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telnet |
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http |
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etc. |
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Example 3 (TSF_6) |
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The firewall administrator, and only the
firewall administrator, can perform the following functions: |
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display and modify the firewall access control
parameters |
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initialise and modify user authentication data |
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etc. |
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