Developing A Common
Criteria Protection Profile
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Overview |
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Preparation |
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Development |
Overview
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What is a PP? |
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What is a ST? |
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How are they used? |
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How are they Related? |
Protection Profile
Definition
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Complete Set of Functional and
Assurance Requirements to Address an Identified set of Security Objectives |
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Reusable Set - Abstract to be Met by
Various Implementations |
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Statements of Wants and Needs |
Security Target
Definition
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Developer Response to Statement of
Requirements |
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Contains Requirements Similar to PP |
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Specific Set - Based on Implementation |
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Statement of “I Provide” |
Protection Profile Usage
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Users (User Advocates) - State
Real-World Requirements |
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Developers - Gauge Market |
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Research/Academia - State Good Security
Sets |
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Evaluators - Have Basis to Assess |
Security Target Usage
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Users (User Advocates) - Compare
Implementation to Stated Needs |
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Developers - Communicate Provision |
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Evaluators - Basis for Assessing
- Basis for
Resource
Allocation |
PP/ST Relationship
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“I want” vs “I provide” |
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Generic vs Specific |
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Requirements vs Specifications |
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ST can be in Response to no PP -
Developer states they meet requirements that customer has yet to communicate |
Preparation
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Know the Target Technology |
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Know General Security Objectives |
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Know of Prior Work for Target
Technology |
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Build on that work |
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Start from scratch |
Protection Profile
Structure
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Descriptive Front Matter |
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Intended (Generic) Security Environment |
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Security Objectives |
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Requirements to Meet Objectives |
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Rationale of How Requirements Meet
Objectives |
Protection Profile
Structure:
Descriptive Front Matter
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PP Name |
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Abstract - Short Description |
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Product Type and its Intended Usage |
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General IT Security Characteristics |
Protection Profile
Structure:
Intended Security Environment
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Threats Intending to Address/Counter |
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Threat Agent |
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Attack |
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Asset |
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Description of Organizational Security
Policies |
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Secure Use Assumptions |
Protection Profile
Structure:
Security Objectives
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IT Security Objectives |
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“Executive summary” of security
capabilities provided by the TOE |
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Drive the Security Function
requirements |
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Non-IT Objectives |
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“Executive summary” of constraints on
how TOE be operated |
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Ultimately drive the details of the
user and administrator documentation |
PP Structure:
Requirements to Meet Security Objectives
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Functional |
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Desired Security Behavior of IT that
can be observed by Investigating a TOE |
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Assurance |
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Security Functional
Requirements
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Select Security Functional Requirements |
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Part 2 of the Common Criteria |
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Agreed to as Useful and Evaluatable |
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Tailor Security Functional Requirements |
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Reconcile dependencies among Security
Functional Requirements |
CC Part 2 Structure
Example
Functional Requirements
Classes
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Security Audit (FAU) |
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Communication (FCO) |
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Cryptographic Services (FCS) |
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User Data Protection (FDP) |
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Identification and Authentication (FIA) |
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Security Management (FMT) |
Functional Requirements
Families
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Contains Sets of Security Components |
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Components in Family Share Security
Objectives |
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Components in Family Differ in Rigor or
Emphasis |
Functional Requirements
Components
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Smallest Effective Group of
Requirements |
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Contains List of Evaluatable Statements
called “Elements” |
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Component is like a phrase in natural
language |
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Element is like a word in the phrase |
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Component may have multiple “levels” |
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Each could contain more functions, or |
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Each could extend functions to more
users |
Tailoring SFRs
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Flexibility to Tailor Functional
Requirement Components from Part 2 |
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Through operations |
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Three Types of Operations |
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Assignment |
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Selection |
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Refinement |
Assignment Operation
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Specification of a parameter filled in
when component is used |
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“Fill in the Blank” operation |
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Allows PP writer to provide information
relating to application of the requirement |
Selection Operation
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Specification of elements selected from
a list given in the component |
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“Multiple Choice” operation |
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Allows PP writer to select from a
provided list of choices |
Refinement Operation
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Addition of detail to component |
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“Essay Question” operation |
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Allows PP writer to specify additional
detail to narrow the scope of a SFR |
Rationale for SFRs Chosen
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Need to Consider Whether: |
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Objectives address environment |
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Requirements address Objectives |
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Consistency |
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Completeness |
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Technical Soundness |
Security Assurance
Security Assurance
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An attribute of an IT product or system
reflecting the confidence that can be placed in the ability of the security
features of an IT product or system to enforce the security policy. |
Requirements &
Operations
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Choosing Assurance Requirements |
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Part 3 of the Common Criteria |
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Common security assurance measurement
scale |
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Operations on Assurance Requirements |
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Refinement |
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Completeness, Consistency &
Technical Soundness |
Assurance Classes
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Configuration management (ACM) |
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Delivery and operation (ADO) |
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Development (ADV) |
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Guidance documents (AGD) |
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Life cycle support (ALC) |
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Tests (ATE) |
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Assurance Maintenance (AMA) |
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Vulnerability assessment (AVA) |
Predefined Evaluation
Assurance Packages
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Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) |
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Uniformly increasing scale, seven
levels |
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Assurance obtained is balance of cost
and feasibility |
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Achieved by substitution and addition |
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Possible to represent other
combinations |
Assurance Requirements
Composition “Rules”
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Dependencies |
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On other assurance and functional
requirements |
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Hierarchical Relationships |
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Each assurance component level is a
strict superset of the lower level(s) |
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Operations |
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Refinement (on components) |
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Augmentation (on assurance packages) |
Refinement Operation
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Refinement |
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e.g. |
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The CM system shall provide an
automated means to ensure that only authorized changes are made to the TOE
implementation representation. This shall be compatible with SCCS. |
Augmentation Operation
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Flexibility to tailor Assurance
Packages |
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Evaluation Assurance Levels from Part 3 |
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Meet specific needs |
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Specify Part 3 assurance component(s)
in addition to those in an Assurance Package |
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higher component in the same family |
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component from another family |
IT Security Requirements
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Functional |
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Assurance |
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……… and there’s more ! |
Extended Requirements
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Allowed in a ST and PP |
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Functions and Assurance |
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Flexibility to prescribe requirements |
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not contained in either Part 2 or Part
3 |