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Overview |
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Preparation |
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Development |
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What is a PP? |
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What is a ST? |
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How are they used? |
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How are they Related? |
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Complete Set of Functional and Assurance
Requirements to Address an Identified set of Security Objectives |
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Reusable Set - Abstract to be Met by Various
Implementations |
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Statements of Wants and Needs |
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Developer Response to Statement of Requirements |
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Contains Requirements Similar to PP |
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Specific Set - Based on Implementation |
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Statement of “I Provide” |
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Users (User Advocates) - State Real-World
Requirements |
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Developers - Gauge Market |
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Research/Academia - State Good Security Sets |
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Evaluators - Have Basis to Assess |
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Users (User Advocates) - Compare Implementation
to Stated Needs |
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Developers - Communicate Provision |
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Evaluators - Basis for Assessing
- Basis for
Resource
Allocation |
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“I want” vs “I provide” |
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Generic vs Specific |
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Requirements vs Specifications |
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ST can be in Response to no PP - Developer
states they meet requirements that customer has yet to communicate |
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Know the Target Technology |
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Know General Security Objectives |
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Know of Prior Work for Target Technology |
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Build on that work |
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Start from scratch |
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Descriptive Front Matter |
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Intended (Generic) Security Environment |
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Security Objectives |
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Requirements to Meet Objectives |
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Rationale of How Requirements Meet Objectives |
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PP Name |
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Abstract - Short Description |
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Product Type and its Intended Usage |
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General IT Security Characteristics |
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Threats Intending to Address/Counter |
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Threat Agent |
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Attack |
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Asset |
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Description of Organizational Security Policies |
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Secure Use Assumptions |
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IT Security Objectives |
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“Executive summary” of security capabilities
provided by the TOE |
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Drive the Security Function requirements |
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Non-IT Objectives |
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“Executive summary” of constraints on how TOE be
operated |
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Ultimately drive the details of the user and
administrator documentation |
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Functional |
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Desired Security Behavior of IT that can be
observed by Investigating a TOE |
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Assurance |
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Select Security Functional Requirements |
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Part 2 of the Common Criteria |
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Agreed to as Useful and Evaluatable |
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Tailor Security Functional Requirements |
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Reconcile dependencies among Security Functional
Requirements |
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Security Audit (FAU) |
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Communication (FCO) |
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Cryptographic Services (FCS) |
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User Data Protection (FDP) |
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Identification and Authentication (FIA) |
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Security Management (FMT) |
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Contains Sets of Security Components |
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Components in Family Share Security Objectives |
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Components in Family Differ in Rigor or Emphasis |
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Smallest Effective Group of Requirements |
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Contains List of Evaluatable Statements called
“Elements” |
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Component is like a phrase in natural language |
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Element is like a word in the phrase |
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Component may have multiple “levels” |
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Each could contain more functions, or |
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Each could extend functions to more users |
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Flexibility to Tailor Functional Requirement
Components from Part 2 |
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Through operations |
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Three Types of Operations |
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Assignment |
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Selection |
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Refinement |
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Specification of a parameter filled in when
component is used |
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“Fill in the Blank” operation |
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Allows PP writer to provide information relating
to application of the requirement |
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Specification of elements selected from a list
given in the component |
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“Multiple Choice” operation |
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Allows PP writer to select from a provided list
of choices |
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Addition of detail to component |
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“Essay Question” operation |
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Allows PP writer to specify additional detail to
narrow the scope of a SFR |
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Need to Consider Whether: |
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Objectives address environment |
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Requirements address Objectives |
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Consistency |
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Completeness |
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Technical Soundness |
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An attribute of an IT product or system
reflecting the confidence that can be placed in the ability of the security
features of an IT product or system to enforce the security policy. |
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Choosing Assurance Requirements |
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Part 3 of the Common Criteria |
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Common security assurance measurement scale |
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Operations on Assurance Requirements |
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Refinement |
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Completeness, Consistency & Technical
Soundness |
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Configuration management (ACM) |
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Delivery and operation (ADO) |
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Development (ADV) |
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Guidance documents (AGD) |
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Life cycle support (ALC) |
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Tests (ATE) |
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Assurance Maintenance (AMA) |
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Vulnerability assessment (AVA) |
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Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) |
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Uniformly increasing scale, seven levels |
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Assurance obtained is balance of cost and
feasibility |
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Achieved by substitution and addition |
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Possible to represent other combinations |
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Dependencies |
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On other assurance and functional requirements |
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Hierarchical Relationships |
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Each assurance component level is a strict
superset of the lower level(s) |
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Operations |
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Refinement (on components) |
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Augmentation (on assurance packages) |
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Refinement |
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e.g. |
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The CM system shall provide an automated means
to ensure that only authorized changes are made to the TOE implementation
representation. This shall be compatible with SCCS. |
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Flexibility to tailor Assurance Packages |
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Evaluation Assurance Levels from Part 3 |
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Meet specific needs |
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Specify Part 3 assurance component(s) in
addition to those in an Assurance Package |
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higher component in the same family |
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component from another family |
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Functional |
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Assurance |
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……… and there’s more ! |
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Allowed in a ST and PP |
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Functions and Assurance |
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Flexibility to prescribe requirements |
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not contained in either Part 2 or Part 3 |
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